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The late Mr. Thomas Reed had a partiality for patent cases,
although he did not undertake to venture too far into their intrica-
cies. After listening on one occasion to a long argument from his
leading associate in a case of this description, he said: "That was
interesting, very interesting. Do you know there were times when
I thought I actually understood what-he was saying?" The thought
thus characteristically expressed is indicative of a feeling very gen-
erally entertained by the profession. To the general practitioner
patent law usually presents itself as a mystery into which it would
be hopeless for the uninitiated to attempt to penetrate; yet this feel-
ing is based upon a misconception which it were well to remove, for
it is particularly desirable, because of the importance of the subject,
that the ranks of those who practice in patent cases should be
recruited from the profession at large. It is sufficiently manifest
that no one can be fully competent to properly conduct such causes
unless he is, first of all, a good lawyer. Yet such is supposed to be
the difficulty of mastering the subject-matter in cases of that kind,
that it is commonly thought that the essential condition of success in
that branch of the profession is expert knowledge of the physical
arts and sciences, even though accompanied by a very slender knowl-
edge of legal principles; that it is enough, in short, if one is a pro-
fessional in science, though only an amateur in law. Hence it is
that the term "patent lawyer" in the mind of most of the profession
is apt to carry with it a suggestion of depreciation, so far as relates
to the rank the practitioner is entitled to claim in the legal brother-
hood. But all this is far from the truth. The application of our
statutory law to the subject of new and useful inventions, is no
more novel, intricate or difficult than the application of our common
or statutory law to many of the subjects of legal investigation which
may arise in the ordinary practice of every active lawyer. 'Ques-
tions relating to inventions, for example, a're not, as a general rule,
more difficult than those which frequently arise under the revenue
laws as to the classification of imports, or in cases, either in tort or
on contract, where the cause of action arises out of the operation
or failure to operate of the electrical devices which are now so
widely employed in mechanical operations of every kind, or ques-
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tions which involve disputed facts in the broad field of chemistry.
There is, therefore, no reason why the general practitioner should
shrink from the branch of the law relating to patents, and those, as
a rule, who have achieved marked success in that branch have not
been mere specialists. The earlier series of our federal reports
record among the counsel who argued the patent causes of those
days the names of Daniel Webster, Rufus Choate, William H.
Seward, Reverdy Johnson, James T. Brady, William Curtis Nokes,
Caleb Cushing, Benjamin R. Curtis, who continued to practice in
such causes down to the end of his life, and others who were among
the leaders of the American Bar. True, the tendency to specializa-
tion in many directions has greatly increased during the past fifty
years in our own as in other professions-and that is, doubtless, a
necessity. But it has its disadvantages as well as its advantages.
There is danger that constant attention to one class of particulars
may obstruct that comprehensive view of fundamental principles
that should always be preserved in dealing with legal questions. In
the field of patent law the tendency has been towards over-speciali-
zation, and this is to be avoided because, as already suggested, in
view of the vast importance of questions relating to the ownership
of inventions under modern conditions and controlled by enormous
capital, questions which are arising with increasing frequency, it is
of corresponding importance that to their solution should be brought
broad knowledge and wide experience on the part of both Bench
and Bar. This is particularly true for the reason that patent law is
part of the law of monopolies, a subject that at the present time, is
the field of such widely diverging views and violent discussion.
And it is interesting to remember, in view of this fact, that our
patent laws, based, as they are, upon the legal system we derived
from England, had their origin in a revolt against monopolies. The
power to grant exclusive privileges in trade and otherwise, as a
prerogative of the Crown and exercised as a means of favoritism,
gave rise, as is well known, to such abuses that the Parliament of
James First, already feeling the first stirrings of the spirit that,
twenty-five years later, flamed out into the great rebellion, swept
that power away with the single exception of monopolies, granted
for new and useful discoveries, and upon that exception expressed
in the Act 21, James I, is based the patent law, both of England and
this country. It is significant to note that this excepion was made
because, while monopolies which were merely for the private bene-
fit of the grantees were held to be odious and were abolished, monop-
olies to inventors were preserved because, at that early day, it was
perceived that the making of inventions was a thing to be fostered
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and encouraged because it was of benefit to the public. And this
idea is confirmed by the first reported patent case, Edgeberry and
Stephens, in 2nd Salkeld's reports, which was heard before Justices
Holt and Pollexfen, who held that under the proper construction of
the act, a patent might be granted not only to the first inventor, but
to the first introducer of an invention from abroad, which remains
the law of England to the present day.1 This is noticeable, because
in the construction of our own statutes so far as their general policy
is involved, it is sometimes not kept clearly in mind that their
primary object is not to secure the private emolument of inventors,
but to promote a public benefit. Inventors are incidentally public
benefactors, but are not, as a class, philanthropists. They are gen-
erally very far from it. They labor, like the rest of their fellow
citizens, for their own interest, and so far as that is concerned, there
is no reason why they, more -than others, should be rewarded for
time spent or sacrifices made in aiming at a fortune. But, it being
of the highest importance that the public should have the benefit of
their inventions, in order to secure that benefit, the inventor, or in
England, the mere introducer of a new and useful invention, is given
an absolute monopoly for a limited time in its manufacture, use and
sale, in order that it may be free to the public forever after. As the
point is stated in a late decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit: "The public policy declared" (by our patent
statutes) "is this: Inventive minds may fail to produce many useful
things that they would produce if stimulated by the promise of a
substantial reward; what is produced is the property of the inventor;
he and his heirs and assigns may hold it as a secret till the end of
time; the public would be largely benefited by obtaining convey-
ances of these new properties; so the people, through their represen-
tatives, say to the inventor: 'Deed us your property, possession to
be yielded at the end of seventeen years, and in the meantime, we
will protect you absolutely in the right to exclude every one from
making, using or vending the thing patented, without your per-
mission.'
i. "A grant of a monopoly may be to the first inventor by the 21 Jac. x;
and if the invention be new in England, a patent may be granted, though the
thing was practiced beyond sea before; for the statute speaks of new manu-
factures within this realm; so that if they be new here, it is within the statute;
for the act intended to encourage new devices useful to the kingdom, and
whether learned by travel or by study, it is the same thing." 2 Salk. 447.
2. Rubber Tire Wheel Co. v. Milwaukee Rubber Works Co., 154 Fed. Rep.
358, 361.
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It may be remarked as to this statement, that while the inventor
has an undoubted right to keep his invention secret, and may pro-
tect himself against those who would wrongfully divulge it, his right
of property in an invention which, from its nature, cannot be fur-
nished to the public and kept secret at the same'time, such as most
improvements in machinery, is one that the law, without the statute,
is inadequate to protect. Inventions which can be kept secret belong
almost exclusively to the class which depend upon secret processes
of manufacture. The inventor who invents an improvement in
looms, for example, consisting of some new combination in parts
of its mechanism, which once seen can be repeated by any other
loom manufacturer, would find it scarcely possible to keep it secret
or to find any profit in doing so. Yet the invention might effect a
valuable economy in weaving and be of public benefit and belongs
to an immense class of inventions to which the protection of the
patent laws extend. The broad ground of public policy in such
cases justifies the granting of the patent monopoly in order to enable
the inventor to make a profit out of that which would, if unpro-
tected by the patent, yield him practically nothing; because, in that
way, the public secures the benefit of inventions that, otherwise, in
all probability, would not be made at all.
This power to grant monopolies for useful inventions was exer-
cised by the colonial assemblies as a recognized principle of English
law falling within the domain of the home rule which they claimed
and exercised before their separation from the mother country.
Massachusetts and Connecticut, for example, granted patents prior
to 1775, and New York, in 1787, granted to John Fitch a patent for
his steamboat. But our present patent system, under the power
given by the Constitution to Congress to grant to inventors for a
limited time the exclusive right to their discoveries, was first embod-
ied in the general Act of 1836, prescribing the conditions, proceed-
ings and terms upon which patents for inventions may be granted,
which, though revised, amended and altered in certain particulars,
remains essentially -the same to the present time and may be justly
regarded as one of the chief causes of our growth in wealth and
power. Indeed, it has been quoted as the remark of some distin-
guished statesman, that, in view of all its consequences, the passage
of the Patent Act of 1836 was the most important event in the his-
tory of our country between the adoption of the Constitution and
the Civil War. This legislation, it will be observed, was merely the
adaptation to the peculiar circumstances and genius of our own peo-
ple of a principle familiar for centuries to the law of the English-
speaking people. It has been construed by our Federal Courts in a
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series of decisions, forming a body of law, little known to the pro-
fession at large, but which, in their reasoning, their even-banded
justice between the rights of the inventor upon one hand and that
of the public upon the other, and their lucid discussion of principles,
form a contributi6n to our jurisprudence that has done not less than
the laws themselves to promote the public welfare and advance the
material progress of the nation.
But while this highly desirable result has been attained, the prac-
tice and procedure in patent causes are probably more costly and
dilatory than in any other branch of the law, and there seems to be
no adequate remedy, except through an increase of the Federal
judiciary. The retention in the Federal Courts of so many features
of the old Chancery practice bears heavily upon infringement suits.
Under the equity rules the evidence in such cases is almost invari-
ably taken orally before an examiner who has no power to rule upon
objections and whose functions are little more than those of a mere
scribe. Indeed, his presence is usually dispensed with except when
called upon to administer the oath to witnesses or decide upon the
length of adjournments. Not infrequently the expert witness is
left for days by himself to dictate his direct examination to the type-
writer. In addition to this, a practice has grown up which seems
to be peculiar to this class of equity causes. The equity rules also
prescribe that-the examiner "may, upon all examinations, state any
special matters to the Court as he shall think fit," which has, as a
matter of practice in patent cases, been interpreted to mean that he
shall take down any statement which the counsel shall think fit, with
the result that whole pages of the record are constantly taken up
by the controversies of counsel, each cilling the attention of the
Court to the delinquencies of his adversary, all of which is both
unnecessary and futile. Objections to evidence are theoretically
reserved to the hearing, but the attempt to separate that which is
immaterial or incompetent in a long-printed record and motions to
strike out are usually not worth making. The consequence of all
this is that the time consumed in taking testimony in patent causes
and the expense of doing so, have become crying evils. Months and
even years are occupied in this way. In a memorial to the Supreme
Court presented on behalf of the New York Bar Association with a
view of obtaining some modification of the present method of taking
testimony in equity cases in the Federal Courts, it appeared that the
cost of the record in nine such cases in the Second Circuit alone, all
of which, with a single exception, were infringement suits, ran from
$2,9oo to $28,9oo, and the records contained from 1,449 to 14478
pages, the average cost being $9,Ioo per case and the average num-
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ber of pages, 4,553. It will be seen from this that the average cost
of taking the evidence is about $2.oo a page. This includes exam-
iner's fees, extra copies and printing, excluding expert and counsel
fees. The examples cited contained long records, but records of
over a thousand pages are common and few fall below, at least, sev-
eral hundred. The result is that either to bring or to defend an
infringement suit involves an expense that is often prohibitory and
the cause of a failure of justice. The owner of a patent has to see
his invention become public property, because he cannot afford to
prosecute infringers and a manufacturer advised that he has a good
defense to a charge of infringement has to submit to an unfounded
demand- because he cannot afford to contest it.
The most efficient remedy for this evil would be the adoption of
the State Court practice of taking the evidence in equity cases in
open Court, in the same manner as in actions on the law side of the
Court, or, at all events, in the adoption of this practice in patent
suits in equity. But this remedy is impracticable with the present
number of federal judges. If all patent causes were tried in open
Court there would be few others heard at the Equity Terms in the
Circuits where any considerable number of those suits are brought.
For even if all immaterial and incompetent evidence were ruled out,
the issues in patent causes are such that their hearing must, as a
general thing, necessarily consume a long time. It is only, however,
by the establishment of a division of the Court for the hearing of
patent cases only, where witnesses can be examined in the presence
of the judge, that it seems possible to obtain adequate relief and
open the doors of justice in controversies over inventions to those
of moderate means as well as to the wealthy. But to do this requires
an increase in the judicial force, and many causes make it most dif-
ficult to secure such an increase from Congress. It can only be
hoped that its necessity will finally be sufficiently widely appreciated
to bring it about.
There is, however, a still greater necessity for supplying a most
serious defect in our present system for determining patent causes.
This defect arises from the absence in that system of a single court
of final appeal. Prior to the creation of our Circuit Courts of
Appeals, an appeal lay as matter of right in all patent causes to the
Supreme Court of the United States. The result was that a degree
of uniformity was attained in the construction and application of our
patent laws that has not since been possible. The rules of decision
established by the court of final resort were binding upon the Fed-
eral Courts throughout the Union; but now there is no such regulat-
ing power. Our Circuit Courts of Appeals in their decisions are
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bound together by comity only, not by authority, and this is not only
the occasion of direct conflicts of decision between them, but, even
where a direct conflict does not appear, the rules of construction
relating to patents are applied in a sensibly different manner in dif-
ferent localities. The Circuit Courts of Appeals in that as in other
matters and as is inevitable in all Courts, respond in a measure to
the prevailing tone of public opinion in the community over which
their jurisdiction extends. Patents are liable to be more strictly
construed in some parts of our country than in others. The claims
of the owner of the patent, therefore, may be, and doubtless often
are, rejected in one Court, where, upon the same record, they would
have been allowed in another. Where there is a direct conflict of
decision a petition to bring the case before the Supreme Court by
certiorari is generally allowed, but, as such cases have no prefer-
ence upon the calendar of that Court, the confusion caused by con-
trary decisions must necessarily last for the considerable period
which must elapse before there can be a final determination of the
controversy. The inconveniences of such a system are manifest.
The complainant having a patent to enforce naturally seeks a juris-
diction where the Courts are most experienced in such cases and
where he thinks the conditions are most favorable for his success.
As the statute, however, provides that no patent suit can be brought
except in the district where the defendant resides or has a regular
and established place of business, resort is constantly had to the plan
of suing a customer of the real party in interest, which forces the
latter to assume the defence of a suit out of his home district and
under all the disadvantages which the statute was intended to relieve.
The results of a direct conflict of decision are still more serious
where the same invention is held to be within the monopoly of the
patent in one circuit and free to the public in another. This may
be illustrated by a single example.
In a suit brought for the infringement of the Grant patent for a
rubber-tired wheel, a decision was rendered by the United States
Circuit Court for the Eastern District of New York in December,
1898, sustaining the patent.3 This decision was followed by other
courts, among others by the United States Circuit Court for the
Northern District of Ohio in the case of the Rubber Tire Wheel
Co. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., which decision on appeal, after
elaborate argument and consideration, was reversed by the United
States Circuit of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit and the patent held
3. 91 Fed. 978.
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invalid,4 and a petition to the Supreme Court for certiorari was
denied.5  This was in 19o2. In a subsequent suit the Circuit Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit in January, 19o7, have held the
patent valid.6
The consequence, therefore, is that the Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Co., the defendant in the Ohio case and an Ohio manufacturing cor-
poration, is free to make and sell the tires throughout the United
States, and, under the doctrine of the late case of Kessler v. Eldred,7
its goods are also free in its customer's hands, so that the anomaly
is presented at a patent that is good in one part of the country and
invalid in another, which must go far toward rendering it worthless,
and that after a litigation of fully ten years.
The remedy for this state of things and one that has been sought
for many years, is the establishment of a National Court of Patent
Appeals having the jurisdiction in such cases which was formerly
exercised by the Supreme Court before the act constituting the pres-
ent Courts of Appeals went into effect. The growth of the business
of our highest Court has made it impossible for it to exercise that
jurisdiction, as it formerly did, in all cases, but the necessity for the
exercise of such a jurisdiction in all cases still exists. The monop-
oly of a patent extends throughout the whole country. It is defined
by the federal statutes and regulated by the Federal Courts. The
rights and privileges that belong to it affect alike the citizens of
every State, and the appropriate tribunal to act as the final arbiter
of all controversies to which it gives rise, and the only tribunal ade-
quate for that duty, is a single national court. In no other way
than by the establishment of such a court can counsel who are called
upon to give opinions as to the validity and scope of patents which
are intended to be made the basis for the investment of capital, have
the benefit of a series of uniform and authoritative decisions to guide
them, or the manufacturer or dealer;who seeks advice as to a charge
of infringement, feels that if he consults competent counsel, he can
rely upon the advice received, with reasonable certainty. A plan
for such a Court, to hold its sittings in Washington, has been for-
mulated and for a long time advocated before Congress by the
American Bar Association, to which a direct appeal shall lie, as a
matter of right, from the decisions of the Circuit Courts,. while its
4. 116 Fed. 363.
5. 123 Fed. 85.
6. iI Fed. 237.
7. Sup. Ct. Adv. Sheets, No. 14, June, 19o7, p. 61r.
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own decisions are reviewable by the Supreme Court in such cases
as that Court may order to be brought before it.
It is difficult, however, to arouse interest in such a plan or to
bring about an appreciation of its desirability. Comparatively few
have been litigants in patent suits or personally felt thl ill effects of
the present system. Fewer yet have given the subject sufficient
attention to understand that it is only by the wisest and most uniform
administration of our patent laws, such as will be best secured by a
single national Court, that they can be saved from the growth to a
dangerous extent of hostility against them. A hostility born of
ignorance, and not surprising in a time of almost passionate hatred
and fear of all monopolies, that, naturally, does not discriminate
between a monopoly in restraint of trade that is condemned alike by
law and public opinion, and a monopoly the very essence of which
is restraint of trade but which is, nevertheless, upheld by the law
and advocated for the public benefit. This hostility shows itself at
almost every session of Congress in the introduction of amendments
to the statute, which, if adopted, would lead the way to the destruc-
tion of the whole patent system. The general belief in the necessity
of fostering and protecting inventions has always thus far proved
strong enough to prevent dangerous innovations and it is the duty
of every thoughtful citizen to consider and keep that necessity in
mind. When we regard the effect of inventions upon production,
and thereby upon the conflict between employed and employing
labor, upon the sources of wealth, upon the means of transportation
and the machinery of modern warfare, and consider the increased
competition between the civilized nations, brought about by the vast
increase in facilities of communication that have drawn the whole
world together, we shall see that a prime factor in determining the
place we shall hold in the struggle for supremacy must be the inven-
tive genius of our people. The Japanese have not been noted for
their creative powers, but their mere facility in learning and adopt-
ing the inventions of Western civilization enabled them to step in a
few years from what was regarded as not above the level of a semi-
civilized Oriental community to a place, among the great powers of
the earth. It is only through the laws relating to inventions that
in our own case this motive force in our progress, and indispensable
source of our strength and prosperity can be maintained,, and to
uphold and improve them, where improvement is needed, should be
a cherished maxim of our national policy.
Edmund Wetmore.
